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Introduction 
Significant deposits of oil and gas are known to exist under the world’s oceans.  New deposits are 
still being discovered or rendered accessible through new or more efficient technologies.   More 
recently, the oceans have become the principal focus for developments in the field of renewable 
energy with the growth in offshore wind farms.  Invariably, energy resources will be shipped by sea, 
or transmitted through undersea pipelines and cables.  The exploration, production and supply of 
energy from the sea impacts on all other oceans activities. This means that marine spaces are at the 
heart of debates about meeting the world’s energy demands, and that international law of the sea is 
at the heart of debates about how such demands are met and balanced against other ocean uses.  
Much of his debate is being framed in terms of energy sovereignty, which raises questions about the 
extent to which States, individually and collectively, can and should be able to secure the energy 
supply needs, and how this will operate in practice.  This paper explores some of the preliminary 
issues that arise from claims about energy sovereignty in respect of marine resources.  This is 
important because as calls for energy sovereignty grow in frequency and force, they must be 
reconciled with well-established rules and values concerning the way in which sovereignty 
operates, as well adapt to the particular physical conditions in which marine energy resources are 
located. 
The paper begins by outlining how debates about energy sovereignty have developed, with 
specific reference to marine spaces, and points out that international legal instruments do not 
appear to say much, at least directly, about energy sovereignty.  Accordingly it is necessary to try 
and construct some sense of what energy sovereignty means from a legal perspective.  Part three of 
the paper considers the meaning of ‘energy sovereignty’, breaking it down into its component parts: 
energy and sovereignty.  It argues that if we are to regulate energy, then this must accord with the 
physical properties of energy, and in particular adapt to a more nuanced understanding of the 
distinction between energy resources and energy use.  A proper understanding of energy provides 
opens up opportunities to re-imagine the way we regulate energy, or at least properly 
conceptualise the way in which we regulate energy. This is particularly important in the context of 
marine renewables (wind/tidal energy), where the resource is not exclusive, spatially located and 
subject to uncontrolled natural variables, and which present challenges for existing legal 
approaches. Turning to sovereignty, the paper considers how sovereignty is conceptualised.  It 
suggests that relative accounts of sovereignty are more consistent with the realities of energy use, 
and the practice of States.  Accordingly, it becomes difficult to sustain claims to energy sovereignty 
based purely upon securing national interests. However, more nuanced accounts of energy 
sovereignty based may require further analysis. Typical justifications of sovereignty over natural 
resources tend to be couched in terms of good order or as calls for the redistribution of wealth.   
This compares poorly to justifications of property.  Since energy sovereignty is essentially 
concerned with questions of who can control energy resources and supplies, the extent of such 
authority and any limits on this, i.e. exclusive control, then looking at the justifications framed in 
terms of property might better inform debates about the meaning of energy sovereignty.  Some of 
the implications of this approach are highlight with the use of an example drawn from natural 
rights-based approaches to property.  The questions that even one such approach might generate 
suggests that much more research is needed to develop a meaningful understanding of ‘energy 
sovereignty’. 
Energy Sovereignty in Context 
Any consideration of energy sovereignty cannot take place in a vacuum.  It must acknowledge how 
policies, laws and debates have evolved, the meaning and relationship of core terms and concepts, 
and the place of law in shaping any debates.  This part puts the following discussion of energy 
sovereignty into a law of the sea context.  The term energy sovereignty is preferred since this 
accommodates a wider range of perspectives than the more commonly used term ‘energy security.’ 
Use of the term ‘energy sovereignty’ is growing, although its precise meaning is not clear, 
especially when viewed from a legal perspective.  Friends of the Earth define the term as a principle 
whereby “the right of people to have access to energy and to choose sustainable energy sources and 
consumption patterns that will lead them towards truly sustainable societies.”1  The idea is firmly 
located in the discourse of rights and associated with similar movements/concepts such as “food 
                                                             
1 Friends of the Earth International. Annual Report 2013, at 3, available at http://www.foei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/FoEI-Annual-Report-2013.pdf 
sovereignty”.2  It is thus about empowering individuals and ensuring that resources are available to 
meet needs.  In contrast, Bӧhme uses the phrase to describe the approach of energy producing 
countries to secure control over natural resources, especially to resist exploitation of these under 
free market regimes.3  This approach is also known as “energy nationalism”,4 and it is closely linked 
to the more frequently used term “energy security”.  This seeks to ensure that States control access 
to energy resources. 5   The International Energy Agency defines energy security as the 
“uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”6 Similarly, Barton et al define 
it as “a condition in which a nation and all, or most, of its citizens and businesses have access to 
sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of 
major disruption of service”.7  Whilst these approaches do not deny the interests of individuals, 
they place the State at the centre of debates about ensuring energy security. For present purposes it 
is not necessary to synthesise a common meaning of energy sovereignty, but merely to note that 
nuances in any definition of the core concept reflect different views on how to address fundamental 
questions about who controls energy, and how best to structure such control in order to meet the 
needs or interests of energy users.  It may also be observed that different views of energy 
sovereignty are susceptible to different accounts of sovereignty, as explored below.8 
Energy sovereignty is not a new concern.  Control of energy resources has been the object of 
both national/international policy and academic study for much of the twentieth century.9 This has 
mainly focused upon the supply of oil as the means of sustaining military machines and industrial 
development. International lawyers will be familiar with how the desire to secure access to oil 
                                                             
2 N. Bellinger and M. Fakhri, ‘The Intersection Between Food Sovereignty and Law’ (2013) 28 Natural 
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Food Systems  (IDTG, Working Paper, 2005) 21. 
3 D. Bӧhme, EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions? A Focus on the Natural Gas Sector 
(Universitӓtswerlag, Potsdam, 2011) 46-8. 
4 D. Bochkarev and G. Austin, Energy Sovereignty and Security: Restoring Confidence in a Cooperative 
International System. East West Institute Policy Paper 01/2007, at 2, available at 
http://www.ewi.info/idea/energy-sovereignty-and-security-restoring-confidence-cooperative-international-
system 
5 G Kaft and A Korin (eds.), Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century (Greenwood, Santa Barbara, 2009); 
R. Youngs, Energy Security. Europe’s New Foreign Policy Challenge (Routledge, London, 2009); G Bahgat, 
Energy Security and Interdisciplinary Approach (Wiley, 2011).  
6 See http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/subtopics/whatisenergysecurity/ 
7 B. Barton, C. Redgwell, A. Rønne, and D. N. Zillman, ‘Introduction’ in Energy Security. Managing Risk in a 
Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 5. 
8 See part III. 
9 D.R. Bohi and M.A. Toman, The Economics of Energy Security (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1996); D. Yergin, The Quest: 
Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Penguin, London, 2011). 
supplies provoked the Truman Proclamation of 1945,10 influenced the development and regulation 
of oil concession from the 1950’s,11 and came to the fore of debates about international peace and 
security with the emergence of OPEC in the 1970s.12  The post-World War II process of 
decolonisation generated considerable literature on questions of sovereignty over natural 
resources.13  It also highlighted the importance of international cooperation in meeting energy 
supplies given the dislocation of many energy resources from the main consumers of energy. To a 
large extent, it is oil (and gas), which has shaped discussions about the regulation of energy supply, 
and in particular exploration, production and supply lines, as well as the regulation of oil and gas 
markets.  However, in recent decades the regulation of energy has come under increased scrutiny 
from an environmental perspective with the realisation of the impacts of global warming and the 
move towards renewable energy supplies. This has begun to generate a distinct legal literature, or 
at least seek to place energy issues within the broader paradigm of sustainable development.14 
Whilst this has not lessened the importance of traditional concerns about the control of energy 
resources and supplies, it has demonstrated the increasing complexity of factors that need to be 
accounted for in energy regulation.  
The regulation of energy is undoubtedly complex.  Typically this is done through technical 
rules of domestic law, which focus on discreet aspects of energy production systems: exploration, 
exploitation, production and supply.  These are overlaid by rules on planning, health and safety, 
environmental protection, finance and investment, taxation and so on.  In part the complexity is a 
product of the way the domestic law has developed. Thus, it has been observed that energy law has 
evolved incrementally, instrumentally, and in a disjointed fashion.15  And that it focuses on 
adequate supply, rather than efficient or equitable use or environmental consequence.  At the risk 
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Lyster and A. Bradbrook, Energy, Law and the Environment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); 
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Study Analysis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2013). 
15 N.A. Robinson, ‘Foreword’ in Bradbrook and Ottinger, ibid.,  at vii. 
of over-simplifying trends in regulation, approaches have evolved (or perhaps revolved) under 
domestic law from regimes focused upon State centred control to deregulated market based 
approaches, with more recent efforts that seek to blend public and private regulatory approaches.16  
Domestic regimes and regulatory approaches are dynamic systems, continuously evolving novel 
and differentiated tools to regulate energy activities.   
Leaving aside the complex relationship between domestic and international law, it remains 
necessary for international law to provide a sufficiently coherent and certain basis for operation of 
domestic regulatory regimes, whilst also ensuring that such regimes respect necessary limits 
dictated by international law.17  More specifically international law has a central role to play in six 
aspects of energy regulation. Firstly, it determines, or provides the framework for, how 
transboundary or common resources are to be utilised.  At root these are essentially questions 
about who controls a non-exclusive resource.  Commentators have long been concerned with how 
international law should deal with common deposits of oil and gas reserves.18  However, renewable 
resources may present even more complex problems of international coordination and 
cooperation. For example, wind and tidal energy are the product of common pool resources and 
which results from complex natural processes that reach beyond the exclusive control of any 
State.19  As such they require coordinated regulation between States in accordance with the natural 
patterns of the energy system, as well as the consequences of its capture.  This is particularly 
important in the marine environment where the interplay of States rights and duties is more 
complex. Secondly, it may constrain the ability of States to control or interfere in energy production 
activities, particular through the law on protecting foreign investment.20 Thirdly, international law 
facilitates access to and supply of energy resources.  Many energy resources are dislocated from the 
users of energy and so international networks of supply (pipelines, cables and transport routes) are 
                                                             
16 B. Barton et al, ‘Introduction’ in B. Barton et al (eds) Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 3. 
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aspects of common pool resources, see R. Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources (Hart, Oxford, 2006). 
20 See generally R. Dolzer and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012); M. Sornaraja, The International Law on Foreign Investment 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2010); S.L. Escarcena, Indirect Expropriation in International Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2014).  
required to support the transfer of energy and raw materials.  Again, this is important in a marine 
context where the oceans provide a medium for such networks. Thirdly, international law provides 
the basic framework for controlling the transboundary consequences of energy use – i.e. 
transboundary pollution.  Fourthly, international law coordinates responses to global challenges, 
and in particular climate change.  Fifthly, it may facilitate the coordination of domestic energy law 
regimes and policies, including finance, technological support and training for the developing 
countries.   
International law has much to say on some aspects of energy sovereignty, particularly 
transboundary pollution,21 and protection of investments from expropriation.22 However, it has 
surprisingly little to say, at least directly, on the meaning of energy sovereignty or sovereignty over 
energy resources in the marine environment.  For the most part this appears to have been 
subsumed within existing doctrines of territorial sovereignty. 
Three law of the sea instruments refer to energy in the context of pollution.23 Of these, only 
the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)24 directly addresses the issue of sovereignty 
over energy.  Article 56(1)(a), provides that coastal States have: “sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to 
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of 
energy from the water, currents and winds”. This is however qualified under Article 56(2), which 
requires coastal States to exercise such rights with due regard to the rights and interests of other 
States, and in a manner compatible with the LOSC.  This places a balancing of interests at the core 
heart of any questions about energy sovereignty.25  Although not dealing with the question of 
sovereignty, Article 60(1) is important since it provides the basis for regulating structures used to 
access marine energy resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  Coastal States are allocated 
                                                             
21 See P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 3rd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009). 
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25 Regard may also be had to Article 59 which requires that conflicts about unattributed rights are resolved 
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exclusive rights to construct, operate and use such structures.26 Decisions concerning the 
placement and operation of such structures must take into account navigational concerns, whilst 
their removal must have due regard to fishing and protection of the marine environment.27  Energy 
supply is not directly mentioned, but is covered by Article 79, which provides that ‘All States are 
entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf’.  As with the above 
provisions, this also includes a ‘balancing of interests’, which permits the coastal State to take 
reasonable measures to ensure the enjoyment of its resource related rights.28  Under Article 87, the 
rights to establish installations, which would include energy generation devices, is listed as one of 
the freedoms of the high seas, and is to be exercised with due regard to the interests of other States. 
Under the law of the sea, sovereign rights over energy resources are allocated to coastal States 
within the EEZ or continental shelf, and to all States on the high seas.  In each case, however, the 
exercise of such rights in inherently subject to a balancing of interests in light of other States 
interests and potentially competing sues of sea space.  Beyond this, little guidance is provided as to 
the way in which such rights are to be exercised. 
The second main reference to energy sovereignty in a multilateral instrument occurs in the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).29  The ECT aims to promote the cooperation in the energy field and 
the development of an efficient energy market throughout Europe.30  Its remit is generally limited 
to investment protection, rather than the regulation of sovereignty or the wider range of energy-
use activities.31 The ECT applies to contracting States territories, including territorial waters and 
sea and seabed areas where the State exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction.32   Article 18 of the 
Energy Charter Treaty declares States “sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources”.  
This is to be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law. Although the 
ECT is committed to the development of energy markets, this does not limit State’s authority and 
discretion as to how they structure the ownership of energy resources. Although the treaty 
‘promotes access to resources’, this hortatory requirement does not trump sovereignty and leaves 
the ownership of resources unaffected.33  This is reaffirmed by Article 18(3), which provides that 
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29 Reproduced in (1995) 33 ILM 360.  
30 Article 2 of the ECT, and Title I of the Concluding Document of the Hague Conference on the European 
Energy Charter.  
31 See generally, T. Wälde (ed.) The Energy Charter Treaty. An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade 
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32 Article 1(10). 
33 Article 18(2). 
“[e]ach state continues to hold in particular the rights to decide the geographical areas within its 
Area to be made available for exploration and development of its energy resources, the 
optimalization of their recovery and the rate at which they may be depleted or otherwise exploited, 
to specify and enjoy any taxes, royalties or other financial payments payable by virtue of such 
exploration and exploitation, and to regulate the environmental and safety aspects of such 
exploration, development and reclamation within its Area, and to participate in such exploration 
and exploitation, inter alia, through direct participation by the government or through state 
enterprises.”  The ECT pays lip service to environmental concerns with a sweeping list of factors to 
be taken into account. Article 19 comprises a list of eleven hortatory action points that request 
parties to “promote”, “have regard to” or “take into account” certain environmental matters.  For 
the most part objectives like public participation, the polluter pays principle, the use of 
environmentally sound technologies, and environmental impact assessment, are addressed in 
greater detail in other instruments.34 
 The term “energy sovereignty” as indicated at the outset might best be understood as a 
policy assertion, rather than legal principle; its broad objectives sit uncomfortably with how we 
understand legal principles to function. However, to downplay the relevance of law is dangerous 
since assertions of energy sovereignty draw upon legal concepts and may generate normative 
consequences.  As such it remains important that we try to map out how such assertions can and 
should fit into legal discourse.  This enquiry forms the basis of the next part. 
Defining Energy and Sovereignty 
What is Energy? 
If we are to talk meaningfully about energy sovereignty then it is necessary to understand the 
object of sovereignty.  What is energy?  This is not an easy question to answer, especially for a non-
scientist.  It can be regarded as an abstract scientific construct used to interpret aspects of reality. 
Yet it may also be observed and measured.  In either case, there are aspects of energy that are not 
fully understood or explicable.  As a noted physicist has observed: “It is import to realize that in 
physics today, we have no knowledge of what energy is.”35  A provocative remark, it should signal 
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the fact that knowledge is contingent and changeable, and this needs to be factored into regulatory 
regimes. 
To help frame the present discussion, energy can be defined as the power derived from the 
utilisation of physical or chemical resources.  It is a property that a system possesses and can be 
used to do work.  This is done by transferring energy from one object or system to another, for 
example, by burning fuel to produce heat, or converting kinetic energy from water into electricity.  
Scientists tell us that energy may take a variety of forms: electrical, light, elastic, kinetic, sound, 
thermal, chemical, gravitational and nuclear energy. These are generally reduced to potential or 
kinetic forms of energy.  Each of these forms of energy may be stored, accessed and used in 
different ways depending upon its physical properties, location and the state of technology. Since 
energy has properties that determine how it can be used, these factors must be taken into account 
in the design of any regulatory regime.  This applies to both specific rules and broad principles such 
as sovereignty.  Thus is a particular resource or form of energy is not exclusively located within a 
State, then it is generally not susceptible to claims of sovereignty.                                     
 The physical properties of an energy resource determine the how it may be regulated.  For 
example, sunlight is ubiquitous and results in approximately 170,000 terrawatts of energy being 
delivered to the earth each day.36 Much is reflected back into space, but the residual energy is 
estimated to be one hundred times more than the current energy supplies.37  It is fungible, non-
exclusive and intangible.  It warms the earth to levels that are conducive to life.  It is essential to the 
sustenance of life through photosynthesis.  It provides a source of renewable energy. As a general 
category or source of energy, these factors render it a common resource; it cannot be possessed or 
rendered excludable, either by way of sovereign claims or individual ownership.  This would be 
physically impossible, but also morally objectionable because it would deprive non-owners or 
persons without access of the means to an essential good.  Of course this general proposition 
admits qualifications since some limited absence of light may result from other factors, such as 
building shade.38  Another example is wind energy.  Wind is the movement of air across the surface 
of the earth as denser cool air moves to fill space in low pressure area or warm air.  This movement 
is the product by differences or changes in air pressure, which are in turn the result of thermal 
                                                             
36 D.J. Rose, Learning About Energy  (Plenum Press, New York, 1986) at 71. 
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changes and the rotation of the Earth.  Wind stores kinetic energy, which may be capture through 
wind turbines, which convert the energy into electrical or mechanical energy.  Global potential for 
wind energy is estimated to be around 72 terawatts.39  Wind performs a critical function in natural 
weather systems.  It provides a renewable source of energy.  It is also intangible, fungible and non-
exclusive, so like sunlight is a common resource.  This indicates that at least some aspect of energy 
regulation of solar or wind energy requires international cooperation.  In the case of sunlight and 
wind, the energy may be captured at fixed points and this takes energy out of the natural system.  
This may allow for regulation under the ‘law of capture’ within individual States.40   However, this 
may fail to account for important externalities.  In the case of wind energy, capture subtracts from 
downstream users.41  Wind flow is distorted or reduced when passing through a turbine, leaving 
less kinetic energy for capture by other users.42   Accordingly, some element of collective or 
cooperation regulation between States will be required.  The examples of renewable energy may be 
contrasted with spatial fixed, tangible, finite sources of energy like coal or oil. These are excludable 
and frequently reduced to State or private ownership, at least when located exclusively within a 
single State.  However, even in these cases, the use of such resources will produce externalities (e.g. 
transboundary pollution) that entail some degree of collective regulation.  
The physical attributes of energy may also impact upon the way in which it is regulated in 
less obvious, but equally important way.  It is a fundamental law of physics that energy cannot be 
created from nothing or destroyed.  Energy can only be transformed from one state to another.  
This is known as the law of the conservation of energy and it raises some interesting questions 
about the nature of energy.  In particular, one should question whether or not it is meaningful to 
talk in terms of ‘energy sovereignty’. It is a fact of nature that we cannot control energy absolutely, 
but merely its potential at certain points in time or space. And even this is technologically 
contingent. If energy is not consumed but merely changes state then is it possible to exert 
sovereignty over energy per se?  Rather it seems more useful to talk about control not of energy, but 
of control over the opportunities to change its state. At the very least, this attribute of energy 
suggests that its use will generate consequences beyond the scope of an individual agent’s ability to 
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control.  Such externalities might include the uncontrolled dissipation of energy from industrial 
power generation, or the creation of by-products, which the State is unable to handle, or pecuniary 
costs by others that are pay for the consequences an energy use activity. If this is true, then 
sovereignty, narrowly construed in terms of exclusive power over a resource seems to be a limited 
framework for control.  Instead we ought to consider control over energy being defined in much 
more nuanced way terms that reflect its natural qualities and consequences of its use. 
A second factor – the location of an energy resource - may determine aspects of its 
regulation.   For example, fossil fuels are physically located in fixed positions in the ground or 
seabed.  Their fixed location determines the spatial parameters for extraction activities and may 
determine which States(s) can control extraction.  On land such resources are normally subsumed 
within the doctrine of territorial sovereignty and are at the host State’s disposal, at least when they 
are located wholly within that State’s territory.  As indicated above, transboundary deposits of oil 
and gas require cooperative arrangements in order to facilitate exploitation since they cannot be 
exploited without impacting upon other State’s territorial rights.43   Deposits of oil or gas within 
marine areas are subject to a degree of exclusive control when located in the EEZ or continental 
shelf.  However, such spaces are subject to additional restrictions that protect the interests of other 
States or the international community.44 Location is important to questions of energy supply and 
transmission.  Since energy resources are unevenly distributed and frequently dislocated from 
places where the resources are needed, energy or raw materials must be transported around the 
world.  Raw materials for energy production (coals and oil) must be transported to centres of 
industry. Gas must be piped from production facilities to storage sites and end users.  Electricity 
must be transmitted from generators to users.  This requires the creation of resilient energy 
systems or networks that can ensure supplies of energy.  Such networks cannot be created by 
individual States but require the cooperation of supply-States, user-States and States of transit.  
This factor reinforces the point that more nuanced versions of sovereignty or control are required 
to adapt to the essential attributes of energy resources.   
The third factor influencing energy regulation is the state of technology. Technology 
impacts on our ability to access and use certain resources.  For example, offshore oil and gas 
exploration only emerged in the 20th century with the development of technology that allowed oil 
and gas to be captured.  Prior to this international law had limited concern for the question of 
                                                             
43 See n 18 above. 
44 See the discussion at 00. 
control over offshore mineral resources.  However, as the capacity to engage in offshore oil and gas 
activities pushed out to sea and could occur at greater depths, so the law had to adapt to this new 
reality. Accordingly, the regime of the continental shelf emerged.  This function of technology was 
explicitly acknowledged in the reference to exploitability in determining the outer limits of the legal 
continental shelf.45  The outward reach of energy activities will continue, with the recent interest in 
the vast potential of methane hydrate deposits on the deep seabed likely to generate new 
regulatory challenges in the Area.46  In the context of wind energy, limitations in energy storage 
technology present the most significant challenges to renewable energy development.  Electricity 
generated can be directed into electricity grids but cannot readily be conserved for use on demand.  
It must either be rejected or diverted.  More sophisticated networks may allow for the diversion of 
surplus energy between States, but will require cooperation between States to manage fluctuations 
in supply and demand.47   
There is some recognition of the different aspects of energy in law.  The Energy Charter 
Treaty deals with the regulation of energy throughout the “energy cycle”, meaning from 
prospecting, though production and consumption, to conversion and supply, and ultimately 
disposal.48 However, as noted above, this provision is framed in hortatory terms.  If we are to 
realise a meaningful account of energy sovereignty, then this must reflect a broader understanding 
of the whole energy cycle and the complexities this involves.  To some extend this already happens, 
and it is reflected in the broader range of environmental and liability laws that govern human 
activities.  In this sense authority to govern energy is already diffused across the system of 
international law.  This conclusion might not be novel, but it serves to reinforce the 
interconnectedness of regulatory matters.  Energy law cannot be viewed apart from wider and 
related legal regimes.  
In summary, if we are concerned with the regulation of energy, then we should be 
concerned with both the control of the sources of energy and processes whereby energy is 
transformed from one state to another.  We also need to be aware of the way in which the nature of 
energy resources and use shape regulation.  As will be demonstrated in the next section, a narrow 
view of sovereignty, drawn in terms of exclusive control over energy resources, does appear to be 
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suited to these essential considerations.  This suggests that questions of energy resource control 
and use to more nuanced accounts of sovereignty. Or in other words it supports a functional 
approach to sovereignty.49  
Observations on Sovereignty 
It is trite but nonetheless true to observe that sovereignty is a controversial and contested 
principle. It is an intellectual construct that may be analysed from a variety of perspectives: 
historical, economic, political, legal and so on.  Each perspective permeates the others. Even within 
the more limited field of international law, discussions of sovereignty diverge considerably and 
generate fierce debate.50  It is not possible to survey and unpack part, never mind all, of this 
material, but some lineaments of it may be remarked upon in order to help us understand how the 
notion of sovereignty might apply to energy resources. Two approaches to sovereignty (focusing on 
its territory or natural resources) are provided in order to illustrate the way in which narrow and 
broad conceptions of sovereignty might accommodate questions about control over energy.  This 
reaffirms the position advanced that only more nuanced constructions of sovereignty can be used 
to deal with energy resources.  
In perhaps the most general terms sovereignty refers to the locus of authority within a 
system.  For international law, as a decentralised system of states, that locus is normally considered 
to be the State.  This is reflected in positive international legal doctrine.  Thus Judge Huber 
described sovereignty as independence: “Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State”.51 Authority in 
this view is framed spatially, sometimes referred to as “territorial sovereignty”. Here sovereignty is 
exclusionary within the spatial limits of the State.  Within this sphere of authority the State may 
exercise absolute control. This view of territorial sovereignty is often associated with an absolutist 
view of sovereignty: the state is either sovereign or it is not.52 Here we can see a basis for the 
second view of energy sovereignty associated with Bӧhme. It has some force since this approach to 
the allocation of authority to States in this way is often regarded as fundamental to the structure of 
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international law.53 There is a general view that sovereignty over natural resources entitles the 
State to freely determine how such resources are dealt with under domestic property and 
regulatory regimes.54 As an intellectual construct, sovereignty does not demand a particular 
definition or content. Understood thus, the absolute view is in no way necessary, although it may be 
regarded as desirable as a means of facilitating good order.  It provides a simplified, yet compelling 
account of a complex world, by carving up the world into non-overlapping territorial units with 
authority to regulate internal matters, subject to a duty not to harm or interfere in the authority of 
other States.55 The actions of other actors, such as individuals, corporations and NGOs, are then 
linked to these centres of authority. International law rules of attribution and accountability 
structure the legal relationships outwards from the central hub of sovereignty. This view is 
reflected in certain rules of international law that retain strong normative influence.  Thus Article 
2(4) on the United Nations Charter requires States to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of other States, and Article 2(7) provides that 
“[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter...”  
Despite the existence of specific rules, which echo an absolutist approach to sovereignty, 
this approach is considered by the most commentators to bear little resemblance to reality.  For 
example Slaughter notes two deficiencies with this view of sovereignty: the ineffectiveness 
challenge, which highlights that States cannot pursue their objectives without some degree of 
political or economic support from other States, and the interference challenge, which recognises 
that the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of States is frequently infringed in practice.56  These 
arguments challenge the exclusionary idea of sovereignty. Even those holding to the classical 
positivist position accept sovereignty as the “fullest rights over territory known to the law”.57 Thus 
law delimits the scope of sovereignty, and the door is open for relative accounts of sovereignty. 
Indeed, absolute sovereignty is under increasing challenge from those that regard sovereignty as a 
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variable or relative concept. Or who advocate a view of sovereignty as a status realised through 
participation in the international system.58 Here sovereignty is regarded as contingent on the 
existence of a society and it is from this society that authority or power is drawn. Relative accounts 
are in the ascendancy.59 
In contrast to the traditional view of sovereignty, within accounts of relative sovereignty 
power is diffuse and manifested through various interactions.  Accordingly, it is possible to view the 
application of sovereignty to natural resources as a series of jural relations concerned with, inter 
alia, the right to possess, use, manage, and enjoy the benefits derived from territory and natural 
resources therein.  And sovereignty is not just about rights; it entails duties.  In order to protect the 
interests of other actors, State are subject to certain duties of non-harmful use or cooperation in 
respect of territory and natural resources.  Sovereignty is meted out and dealt with not in absolute 
terms, but by way of variable, individual transactions. Territory and the resources therein may be 
leased to other States, subject to trusteeship regimes, covered to ‘use-rights’ in favour of other 
States.60 Foreign investment may be secured by exclusive rights to natural resources, and 
guaranteed against expropriation. 61  These dealings may limit how authority is exercised 
temporarily.  They may result in the same resource being subject to multiple uses and degrees of 
control by various actors.  A good example of this is the treatment of fisheries under international, 
EU law and domestic law.62 Although commenting upon how international law deals with property 
rights in respect of natural resources, Redgwell’s brief survey of international instruments and 
cases demonstrates how international law structures and limits control of resources in terms 
analogous to property.63  This reaffirms the above point that sovereignty over resources is 
constructed in terms of discreet jural relations.  An important element of this is the role played by 
international human rights law and the protection of property as a human right.64  Here enjoyment 
of certain rights is directly opposed to the State, indicating a direct concern with needs and 
interests of individuals, rather than States. This view of sovereignty permits more calibrated 
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understanding of the ways in which States act, and more closely resembles how natural resources 
or energy is regulated.  Furthermore, whilst it does not necessarily support the type of 
conceptualization of energy sovereignty as advanced by Friends of the Earth above, it is at least 
consistent with its goal of securing individual access to essential energy needs. 
 Traditional conceptions of sovereignty, as essentially exclusive control over a portion of the 
globe, are simply irreconcilable with the way the world works today.  Many energy resources are 
fluid, and part of complex networks.  This is particularly the case for marine renewable energy 
resources which draw upon components of global systems, and whose use cannot be confined to 
the territory of single States.  This means that more nuanced notions of sovereignty are required to 
support and sustain energy use. However, more recent accounts of sovereign tend to either contest 
the nature of sovereignty or atomise it, examining it as a series of localised jural relations as 
manifest in particular contexts.  The sophistry of such approaches may be better aligned to reality, 
but this renders it difficult to apprise ourselves of how effectively and fairly access to and use of 
energy is determined at the global level.  The main problem with an account of energy sovereignty 
drawn in terms of relative sovereignty is that it may lack coherence.  It collapses into highly 
localised relationships.  It is then exposed to criticism for being descriptive rather than normative. 
International law, like any other social system is a system of informed and patterned behaviour.  
This indicates the need to principles or points of reference to determine the legitimacy of specific 
rules that transcend the individual rules.   In short it requires sovereignty to be justified.  
Justifications of Sovereignty over Energy and Natural Resources 
The main justification associated with sovereignty is that of order and stability of the system.65  In 
the context of resources, much of the literature on the justification of sovereignty over natural 
resources is lacks in depth, focusing on thin justifications based upon redistribution of wealth 
during and post-decolonisation.66  This can be contrasted with the depth of the literature on the 
justification of property and property rights over natural resources.67  The most important 
questions concerning energy are questions related to control.  Who controls energy? How do they 
control energy? What are they entitled to do with the energy? Are there any limits on the use of 
energy? It is suggested that the above justification of sovereignty as is not especially helpful in 
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presenting an analytical framework for considering these questions.  As a way forward, we should 
consider alternative justifications of energy sovereignty.  If we return to the kinds of question we 
wish to answer, then it is clear that they are the same sort of questions that we ask about control, or 
ownership, of any resource.  These questions are at root justification questions, questions about the 
consequences of allocating control of things to certain agencies.  These kinds of justificatory 
questions are quite well established in the context of property rights.68  If this is the correct way to 
look at questions of sovereignty, then it is possible to examine sovereignty in these terms and see 
how this provides alternative perspectives on the way in which we determine the scope of 
sovereignty of energy.  By way of provoking thoughts on the matter, some initial observations on 
how one typical justification of property, as applied to sovereignty, is offered up: sovereignty as a 
natural right. 
In short, the justification of sovereignty as a natural right runs thus, States by virtue of their 
existence as moral agents enjoy exclusive authority over the physical space that constitutes the 
State.  The existence of this authority precedes the existence of any conventional rules governing 
the status of the state, and entails certain rights and duties that must be recognised within 
subsequent conventional rules. 
Natural rights are those rights inherent in certain agent by virtue of their existence, and 
which are not contingent on the laws or custom or some other form of positive authority.  The idea 
that certainty rights are naturally inherent to States naturally has a long tradition. Vattel notes the 
rights of states are “naturally the same as those of any other state”.69  Later, the “general and 
fundamental rule of our duties towards ourselves is, that every moral being ought to live in a 
manner comfortable to his nature… A nation is a being determined by its essential attributes, that 
has its own nature, and can act in conformity with it… The Law of Nature prescribes it certain 
duties.”70  Natural rights view of territorial sovereignty is dismissed by Shaw, who explicitly sees it 
as confusing concepts of property and sovereignty.71  However, it is not without its adherents. The 
idea of the State are deriving authority and being limited by natural law is later evident in the work 
of Martens,72 and resonates in modern approaches to international law including the writings of 
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Lauterpacht73 and Henkin.74  Natural law based approaches retain some currency in explaining the 
way in which international law works.75  At the very least they provide useful modes of analysis.  
What consequences does this justification of sovereignty entail? As noted, a starting point is 
to regard the physical space of the state as an essential component of its agency. Thus territory, and 
the resources therein, comprise part of the State and should not be separated from it.  This at first 
glance seems to support the claim of energy sovereignty linked to energy nationalism. The analogy 
is the agency of individual persons and their body, of which they cannot be deprived.  Of course, the 
analogy is not complete, since States do not necessarily require a particular amount of ‘physical 
form’ to exist, and notion of territory as a fundamental requirement of statehood is notorious fluid. 
This belies a significance attaching to the physical component of the State, and suggests that 
territory and resources are not to be detached from the State without good reason.   This may entail 
limits on the treatment of resources that States cannot disregard.76  
An extension of the natural rights approach is that when States vest their efforts in a 
something, then this by extension of their effort into a thing reduces it to sovereignty.  The analogy 
is the labour-based justification of property by individuals.77  The simple of form of this applies to 
territorial sovereignty generates undesirable consequences, since it essentially justifies a first 
occupation view of sovereignty (possibly conquest or annexation). This is somewhat discredited 
now.  The labour-based approach is potentially corrected by requiring the labour to be socially 
productive labour.  This provides an interesting avenue to explore since most productive activities 
concerning energy extract and use are conducted by a multiplicity of actors, public and private, who 
may have their actions attributed to a range of States.  This may provide a counterpoint to 
simplistic accounts of ‘State directed’ labour and reward for energy production. 
This approach is gaining traction in some recent work by political scientists who advocate 
the attachment based theories of territoriality.78  This appears to be derived from natural rights-
based approaches.  Locke asserted that if one has property in one’s body and labour, then one has 
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property in the product of one’s labour.79 Productive labour generates ownership.  If society was 
formed to protect such rights, then it holds that society at large is governed by the same rule.  As 
Armstrong notes: “national communities may have invested a good deal of care and work in a 
territory or its resources, and as such earned rights over that land or those resources”.80  If this 
argument is to be sustained, then one needs to show that the improvement is not simply the 
aggregate of individual improvements because this only justifies the individual’s claims.  It can be 
argued that States may engage in collective improvements through national development 
programmes (clearing land, mining resources and so on).   
There are some limits to this approach.  Firstly, it is not clear why such improvements 
justify extensive claims to sovereignty, rather than the localised improvements.  Secondly, it is not 
clear that improvements can be attributed to the State membership of a community.  Here the use 
of foreign direct investment may pose problems, since in most cases the extraction and use of 
energy resources is the domain of multinational corporations and such are not attributed to the 
host State.  Secondly, a threshold for improvement is required.  Discovery, extraction, regulation, 
use, transport, transfer of technology are all potential variables.  It is also important not to forget 
the nature of the resource.  Many resources simply occur or flow into the state (sunlight, rainwater, 
rivers), so it is not clear what the State had done to entitle it to them. In many cases the value of the 
improvement is external to the efforts of the State.  In order to avoid these issues, it can be argued 
that the State sustains indirect improvements to the resources. This may be done in two ways.  
Firstly, the State simply establishes the conditions for supporting the means of rewarding 
improvements at the individual level.  Here the argument collapses into one based on propriety or 
order (see below).  Secondly, States can act discreetly in generating improvements, for example by 
legislating laws in respect of land use or in respect of control of resources.  However, such indirect 
improvements are not limited to the State, since at another step removed, international law plays a 
role in directing the use of resources.  This might justify some international stake in the 
improvements.   
This brief outline indicates the relevance of typical justifications of property to questions of 
energy sovereignty and control of natural resources.  It does not explore the full implications of this 
approach.  For example, one might ask how might the Lockean proviso that requires enough and as 
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good be left for others be applied to claims by some States to exclusive control over globally 
important energy reserves.  Neither does this paper consider other important justifications, such 
liberty, identity, utility or efficiency, good order.  Such approaches open up many more questions 
about how we should allocate control over energy resources and in what forms to States (or indeed 
other actors).  It is clear that if we are to take claims about energy sovereignty seriously, and to 
consider how these can and should be advanced, much more work is required to frame the terms of 
the debate.  
 
